Should implies

This shows that reason is practical because the thought is a practical thought. This is something Kant presupposes and the meaning and significance of which fails to be appreciated in the current empiricist environment.

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To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us. All Rights Reserved. OSO version 0. If the differences are significant, the disjunctive non-DOER theory issues implausible prescriptions. This is why the doubling up problem is a problem. Disjunctive theories can be given that deal with the doubling up problem. They can be made, like their closest DOER rivals, to give the right amount of action guidance in all the right places.

However, any solution will necessarily add complexity to the fixed theory, complexity which the closest DOER alternative does not need because it does not face the doubling up problem. Complexity is a general issue for disjunctive non-DOER theories. I should be clear what I mean by this. DOER and disjunctive non-DOER theories seem to contain all the same types of entities reasons and obligations , and so neither is more parsimonious.

Another sort of simplicity is elegance. While elegance tends to be less well defined than parsimony, it has to do with the number and complexity of hypotheses in a theory. The importance of elegance is apparently easier to defend than the importance of parsimony Baker DOER theories are more elegant than their closest disjunctive rivals. If a disjunctive theory gives a satisfactory answer to the doubling up problem, even more complexity is needed.

A final problem with disjunctive theories is what I call disunity. To understand what disunity is, consider again the racist cases. If OIC is true, then in one of the racist cases Duke does wrong by discriminating, and in the other he does not. Yet in both cases Duke has reasons to apologize, atone, or approximate some ideal, and third parties have reasons to avoid complicity in his racism.

On the disjunctive account, it is characteristic of apology, atonement, and avoiding complicity that they are appropriate reactions to wrongdoing. Disjunctive theories thus have two unavoidable costs when compared to their closest DOER rivals: complexity and disunity. The doubling up problem is a cost, but an avoidable one; avoiding it, however, either exacerbates the complexity of the theory, or gives up some of its explanatory power.

Complexity, disunity, and lack of explanatory power are not enough to show that disjunctive theories are false. However, if we have two otherwise equally good moral theories, we should prefer the more elegant, unified, and explanatory one. DOER theories are more elegant and more unified, and potentially more explanatory, and so should be preferred.

To be elegant, unified, and also avoid the doubling up problem, a non-DOER theory needs to give the same explanation of robust action guidance in both ordinary racist and uncontrollable racist. DOER theories appeal to common, morally-relevant features of the cases to explain the obligations in each, and then appeal to obligations to explain robust action guidance. An elegant non-DOER theory can use the shared morally-relevant features to explain robust action guidance directly, without obligations playing this mediating role.

In both ordinary and uncontrollable racist , the explanation of why Duke should apologize for his discrimination might be that discrimination is harmful and does not properly respect human dignity. Since our elegant non-DOER theory endorses OIC, these morally-relevant features can also explain obligations when these obligations are fulfillable.

This is as elegant an explanation as that given by the closest DOER theory. And no disunity arises since, on the elegant non-DOER account, robust action guidance has no association with wrongdoing.

On an elegant non-DOER account, obligations never play any role in explaining robust action guidance. If they were not, then elegant non-DOER accounts would lose both their simplicity and their unity, and would run into the doubling up problem. The wrongfulness of the act plays just as much role in the explanation as the day the act was committed on. Accepting an elegant non-DOER theory thus means giving up the claim that obligations play a central, vital role in guidance.

At best obligations would have importance in a very narrow space. This guidance is fleeting and of necessity plays only a small role in our lives. This is a very impoverished view of how obligations guide, at least in the moral realm. Some disjunctive theories give rise to this same problem. The doubling up problem arises because the features that explain robust action guidance when putative obligations cannot be fulfilled also tend to occur when those obligations can be fulfilled.

This problem can be addressed by significantly reducing the contribution of obligation violation to robust action guidance, so that there is little difference between ordinary and uncontrollable racist in the strength of robust action guidance. On this view, obligations play some role in guidance, but only a very minor role. They do very little to explain robust action guidance in any condition, as they always only contribute a small amount of strength to robust action guidance.

This, too, seems to be an impoverished view of how obligations guide. What this shows us is that one of the core motivations that inclined us to accept OIC—the truism that obligations must guide—better supports the denial of OIC.

Since we can construct DOER and non-DOER theories that give almost exactly the same guidance, we can only decide between them by looking at the virtues of how they explain this guidance.

Theories that deny OIC have significant theoretical advantages, in terms of how they explain guidance, over their disjunctive competitors.

We can give a non-DOER theory that has all of these advantages, but to do so we have to say that obligations play almost no role in guiding action, and this is really giving up the truism that obligations guide.

My argument only gets off the ground if DOER theories are compatible with the guidance principle; that is, my argument relies on a broad reading of the guidance principle, interpreting the principle as saying that obligations are able to guide action if they at least provide robust action guidance. Should we adopt such a narrow reading of the principle? The guidance principle gives us a necessary condition accounts of obligations must meet. If we are to take the narrow reading, rather than a broader one, as giving this necessary condition, we need very good reasons to do so.

I will argue in this section that we do not have such reasons. This evidence does not favor the narrow reading.

Further, as I will argue in Section 4, even intuitions that seem initially to favor OIC and thus the narrow reading are at best equivocal. Turning to our ordinary practices, people often take past or future obligations as giving us reasons to act now e.

If we had some other strong reason to favor the narrow reading, we could likely interpret all of this to be consistent with that narrow reading.

But our intuitions and ordinary practices do not by themselves provide good evidence in favor of the narrow reading of the guidance principle. The other way to justify endorsing the narrow reading of the guidance principle as a necessary condition for accounts of obligation would be to show that our account of obligations gains something very important only if the narrow reading is true.

Important things do turn on the truth of the guidance principle, but we seem to gain nothing of significance if it is the narrow reading, rather than some broader version, that is true. We can see this by considering some of the main motivations given by those who endorse the guidance principle. This favors a broad reading of the guidance principle, not a narrow one.

Another motivation for the guidance principle is that obligations are a kind of reason, and it is characteristic of reasons that we can use them in reasoning about what to do e.

There thus seems to be no benefit to adopting a narrow reading of the guidance principle rather than a broader one. As I showed in the previous sub-section, elegant non-DOER theories give wrongness and obligations an impoverished role in action and practical reasoning. All deliberation at all other times and about all other decisions can simply ignore this obligation.

This view, which says that says every particular obligation is only of fleeting importance, seems to me to be giving up something vital. But then why insist on the narrow reading of the guidance principle? With the assistance of the notion of robust action guidance, we will see that the intuitions which seem most clearly to support OIC do no such thing.

As above, it will be helpful to use two parallel examples to frame our discussion. In the previous section, we considered examples in which an agent could and could not control certain behaviors, and discussed how to account for the fact that similar robust action guidance could arise in both cases.

Intuitively, Daisy violates an obligation in avoidable , but not unavoidable , baby. Equally importantly, there is an intuitive difference in the robust action guidance Daisy receives in each case. In avoidable baby , Daisy should apologize and atone for what she has failed to do. However, the same is not true in unavoidable baby : Daisy simply does not owe an apology or restitution for her failure to save the baby.

A DOER theory needs some way of explaining why Daisy does wrong in avoidable baby but not in unavoidable baby. Nor can it bite the bullet and say she ought to save the baby in both cases, because this would generate inappropriate robust action guidance.

The term is overguidance. A theory overguides when it assigns obligations or robust action guidance in cases where they are clearly inappropriate. Psychology of Decision in Philosophy of Cognitive Science. Social Epistemology in Epistemology. Remove from this list Translate.

The recent explosion of philosophical papers on Confederate and Colonialist statues centers on a central question: When, if ever, is it permissible to admire a person? Other things To solve this problem, I explore several possibilities: that only selective traits of Bates and King are admirable, that Bates and King are admirable despite their grave immorality, and that Bates and King are admirable by virtue of their integrity.

Applied Ethics. Deontology in Applied Ethics in Normative Ethics. Moral Emotion in Normative Ethics. Supererogation in Normative Ethics. Remove from this list. Morally speaking, what should one do when one is morally uncertain? Call this the Moral Uncertainty Question.

In this paper, I argue that a non-ideal moral theory provides the best answer to the Moral Uncertainty Question. I begin by arguing for a strong ought-implies-can principlemorally ought implies agentially canand use that principle to clarify the structure of a compelling non-ideal moral theory. I then describe the ways in which one's moral uncertainty affects one's moral prescriptions: moral uncertainty constrains the set I end by surveying the problems that plague alternative answers to the Moral Uncertainty Question, and show that my preferred answer avoids most of those problems.

Moral Norms in Meta-Ethics. Moral Uncertainty in Meta-Ethics. Values and Norms in Normative Ethics. Remove from this list Direct download 3 more. Specifically, an adequate theory of the objective This chapter describes the structure of a compelling non-ideal moral theory that is both objective and mental state-sensitive. I begin by examining and rejecting various attempts to defend these two theses. The open borders view is frequently dismissed for making infeasible demands. This is a potent strategy.

Unlike normative arguments regarding open borders, which tend to be relatively intractable, the charge of infeasibility is supposed to operate as what we call a "normative argument-stopper.

Bringing about open borders is perfectly feasible on the most plausible account of feasibility. We consider and reject what we take to be the only three credible ways to save the The first fails to vindicate the claim that infeasibility is a normative argument-stopper.

The second does not provide an argument against open borders at all. The third underestimates the power of at least some non-state actors. We conclude by drawing some lessons for the open borders view and the use of feasibility in politics more generally. Cosmopolitanism in Social and Political Philosophy. Global Justice in Social and Political Philosophy. Justice in Social and Political Philosophy. Political Feasibility in Social and Political Philosophy.

Remove from this list Direct download 5 more. We survey several existing candidates duties to try, duties to approximate, duties to do our part, and dynamic duties and argue that none of them succeeds in delivering on the promise of the simple solution.

We then propose a previously untheorized class of duties that we call "duties to devote ourselves" to achieving an outcome, and argue that such duties provide us with an interpretation of hopelessly utopian duties that is up to the task. Trying in Philosophy of Action. Volition in Philosophy of Action.

Remove from this list Direct download 4 more. This book develops an original version of act-consequentialism. It argues that act-consequentialists should adopt a subjective criterion of rightness.

Its findings go beyond the debate about consequentialism and touch on important debates in normative ethics and metaethics. The distinction between criterion of rightness and decision procedures addresses how, why, and in which sense The discussion of the rationales of "ought" implies "can" leads to the discovery of a hitherto overlooked moral principle, "ought" implies "evidence", which can be used to show that most prominent moral theories are false.

Finally, in the context of discussing cases that are supposed to reveal intuitions that favour either objective or subjective consequentialism, the book argues that which cases are relevant for the discussion of objectivism and subjectivism depends on the type of moral theory we are concerned with consequentialism, Kantianism, virtue ethics, etc.

Moral Epistemology, Misc in Meta-Ethics. Objective and Subjective Consequentialism in Normative Ethics. Subjective and Objective Reasons in Philosophy of Action. Usability of Consequentialism in Normative Ethics. Varieties of Utilitarianism in Normative Ethics.

On some religious traditions, there are obligations to believe certain things. However, this leads to a puzzle, since many philosophers think that we cannot voluntarily control our beliefs, and, plausibly, ought implies can.

How do we make sense of religious doxastic obligations? The papers in this issue present four responses to this puzzle. The first response denies that we have doxastic obligations at all; the second denies that ought implies can. The third and fourth responses maintain that we have either This paper summarizes each response to the puzzle and argues that there are plausible ways out of this paradox.

Doxastic Voluntarism in Epistemology. Ethics of Belief in Epistemology. Faith in Philosophy of Religion. Pascal's Wager in Philosophy of Religion. Remove from this list Direct download 2 more. In this paper, I demonstrate that Kant's commitment to an asymmetry between the control conditions for praise and blame is explained by his endorsement of the principle Ought Implies Can OIC. I argue that Kant accepts only a relatively weak version of OIC and that he is hence committed only to a relatively weak requirement of alternate possibilities for moral blame.

This suggests that whether we are transcendentally free is irrelevant to questions about moral permissibility and moral blameworthiness. Free Will in Philosophy of Action.

To take a more realistic example, if there are so many patients suffering from a fatal disease that doctors cannot treat them all, then doctors have no moral obligation to treat them all. Another implication of the principle is that changes in real-world circumstances can cancel some obligations.

For example, if I promised to meet you for lunch, then I have an obligation to do so. But if I'm driving to meet you for lunch and I get into an accident, I get knocked unconscious, and the paramedics throw me in an ambulance and drive me away, so that I cannot meet you for lunch when I promised, then I did nothing wrong.

This implication leads some to object that we can remove obligations by purposely getting ourselves into a situation where we cannot do what we are obligated to do e. But this objection gets it wrong.